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Abstract—This paper studies multi-antenna-aided covert com-
munications coexisting with randomly located wardens and
interferers, considering both centralized and distributed antenna
systems (CAS/DAS). The throughput performance of the covert
communication is analyzed and optimized under a stochastic
geometry framework, where the joint impact of the small-scale
channel fading and the large-scale path loss is examined. To
be specific, two probabilistic metrics, namely, the covert outage
probability and the connectivity probability, are adopted to char-
acterize the covertness and reliability of the transmission, respec-
tively, and analytically tractable expressions for the two metrics
are derived. The worst-case covert communication scenario is
then investigated, where the wardens invariably can maximize the
covert outage probability by adjusting the detection thresholds
for their detectors. Afterwards, the optimal transmit power and
transmission rate are jointly designed to maximize the covert
throughput subject to a covertness constraint. Interestingly, it is
found that the maximal covert throughput for both the CAS and
DAS is invariant to the density of interferers and the interfering
power, regardless of the number of transmit antennas. Numerical
results demonstrate that the CAS outperforms the DAS in terms
of the covert throughput for the random network of interest,
and the throughput gap between the two systems increases
dramatically when the number of transmit antennas becomes
larger.
Index Terms—Covert communications, multi-antenna tech-
niques, outage probability, stochastic geometry, optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the era of Internet-of-Things (IoT), the provisioning ofsecurity and privacy has become a critical issue due to
a soaring amount of devices communicating confidential and
sensitive information, e.g., financial details, identity authenti-
cation, and medical records, etc, over the open wireless media
[1]. Various security methods through cryptographic encryp-
tion [2], [3] or physical-layer (information-theoretic) security
[4]-[6] have been developed to prevent the message content
from being intercepted by unintended recipients. Nevertheless,
there are many real-life circumstances where safeguarding
content secrecy is far from sufficient, and the communicating
parties may desire to transfer the message covertly. Typical
examples include hiding military operations to keep from
being detected by enemies, or concealing secret activities of
an organization to escape the attention of an authoritarian
government monitoring the network. Against this background,
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covert communication, or termed low probability of detection
(LPD) communication, which aims to hide the very existence
of the communication itself from watchful adversaries, has
recently drawn considerable research interests [7]-[12].
A. Previous Works and Motivations
Since the early 20th century, spread-spectrum techniques
have been extensively applied for achieving covert communi-
cations, particularly for military applications [13]. Nonethe-
less, the fundamental information-theoretic limits of covert
communications have not been explored until recently. Specif-
ically, a square root law was presented in [7] for additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, which states that
in n channel uses, at most O(
√
n) bits of information can
be conveyed to an intended receiver reliably and covertly
against a vigilant adversary (warden Willie). This seminal
work was later extended to various channel models such as
binary symmetric channels [8], discrete memoryless channels
[9], [10], multiple access channels [11], and multi-input multi-
output AWGN channels [12].
It is worth mentioning that the square root law built in [7]
manifests that the achievable covert rate, i.e., the rate at which
reliability and covertness are guaranteed simultaneously, ap-
proaches zero as n grows to infinity, i.e., limn→∞
O(
√
n)
n = 0.
Such a pessimistic conclusion motivates increasing endeavors
to be devoted to exploring the condition in which a positive
covert rate can be promised. Fortunately, it has been proven
that a positive covert rate is still achievable when the war-
den has various uncertainties in terms of the receiver noise
power [14]-[16], the exact timing of the covert communication
[17], [18], the fading channel [19], and the jamming signal
deliberately emitted either by the destination itself [20] or by
an external friendly helper [21], [22]. Furthermore, a recent
work [23] showed that the ambient signals from coexisting
interferers also can be exploited to produce a positive covert
rate. By modeling the interferers’ positions as a Poisson point
process (PPP) [24], the authors in [23] revealed that the
maximal covert rate for the interference-limited network is
invariant to the density of interferers.
The vast majority of existing literature concerning covert
communications has been focused on a single-antenna trans-
mitter [14]-[23], whereas the multi-antenna-assisted covert
communication has not been well investigated. Multi-antenna
communication architectures are categorized into centralized
antenna systems (CASs) and distributed antenna systems
(DASs). In the CAS, the antennas are co-located on a single
2device, and a joint signaling design among the antennas
can significantly boost the spectrum efficiency. In the DAS,
the antennas are geographically spread and connected to a
central processor using coax cable or optical fiber. Compared
with the CAS, the DAS can provide rich spatial diversity to
combat path loss and shadowing, reduce the average distance
between a transmit antenna and a receiver, and create more
uniform coverage [25]. Both the CAS and DAS have been
substantially examined in the context of physical-layer secure
transmissions and have been shown to gain a remarkable
security enhancement for various wireless networks [26]-[33].
When applying multiple antennas to covert communications,
two fundamental questions are naturally raised: 1) How
multi-antenna techniques benefit covert communications?; 2)
Which multi-antenna architecture is more applicable to covert
communications? Theoretically, a multi-antenna transmitter is
capable to use less power to support a reliable transmission
by adequately exploiting the spatial degrees of freedom. A
lower energy leakage in return embarrasses the detection for a
warden. In this sense, multi-antenna techniques, if designed
properly, can be beneficial for covert communications. For
another thing, the co-located antennas for the CAS release
a higher power to a neighboring warden compared with any
of the distributed antennas for the DAS because of the spatial
energy dispersion in the latter. However, if a warden is likely
to appear anywhere in a network and meanwhile its location is
uninformed, the geographically spread antennas actually take
a higher risk of being detected by the warden. This might
even offset the potential benefit brought by the spatial energy
dispersion. Therefore, it is not intuitive whether the CAS or
DAS is better suited to covert communications.
Yet so far the two questions posed above have not been
answered explicitly, and the potential of multi-antenna tech-
niques for covert communications in fading channels has
not yet been excavated. In particular, whether the CAS or
DAS can provide a higher covert communication rate is
unclear and the performance gap between them still remain
unknown. Moreover, existing literature on covert communica-
tions has rarely taken into account of multiple wardens and
the uncertainty of their spatial locations when designing the
covert communication. In practice, there exist situations where
wardens desire to hide themselves for a covert detection, and
then their locations appear to be random to the monitored
entity. Although the authors in a recent work [22] considered
multiple randomly distributed wardens, they only concentrated
on the single-antenna system for AWGN channels, and their
results are not applicable to multi-antenna systems with fading
channels. All the shortcomings mentioned above motivate the
current research work.
B. Contributions
This paper explores the covert communication for a random
network where a multi-antenna transmitter communicates with
a single-antenna receiver against randomly distributed single-
antenna wardens and interferers. A comprehensive analysis
and optimization framework for the covert throughput of the
system is provided. In particular, tools from the stochastic
geometry theory [24] are used to capture the impact of channel
fading and path loss on the system performance. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• The covert communication for both the CAS and DAS
is investigated, where maximal ratio transmitting (MRT)
and distributed beamforming (DBF) are employed as
transmit strategies, respectively. For each multi-antenna
system, analytical expressions for the covert outage prob-
ability and the connectivity probability are derived, where
the two metrics are used to depict the covertness and
reliability of the covert communication, respectively.
• An optimization framework incorporating the designs
in terms of the detection of wardens and transmission
parameters is established. Specifically, the worst-case sce-
nario of the covert communication is examined in which
the optimal detection thresholds are determined from the
perspective of wardens. Subsequently, a maximal covert
throughput is achieved through a joint optimization of the
transmit power and the transmission rate.
• Various useful insights into the multi-antenna covert
communication are provided. In particular, an invari-
ance property is revealed for both the CAS and DAS,
which states that the maximal covert throughput for
an interference-limited system is invariant to either the
density of interferers or the interfering power. It is also
demonstrated that the CAS always reaps a throughput
gain over the DAS, and the gain enlarges with more
transmit antennas.
C. Organization and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II details the system model. Sections III and IV analyze
and optimize comprehensively the covert throughput for the
CAS and DAS, respectively. Section V presents numerical
results to validate the theoretical analyses. Section VI draws
a conclusion of this paper.
Notations: Bold lowercase letters denote column vectors.
| · |, ‖ ·‖, (·)†, (·)T, (·)H, ln(·), P{·}, Ev[·] denote the absolute
value, Euclidean norm, conjugate, transpose, Hermitian trans-
pose, natural logarithm, probability, and the expectation taken
over a random variable v, respectively. fv(·) and Fv(·) denote
the probability density function (PDF) and the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of v, respectively. Lx denotes the
polar coordinate (rx,o, θx,o) with a distance rx,o and an angle
θx,o to the origin o. B(o,D) denotes the disc centered at o
with a radius D.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a two-dimensional wireless network comprised of
a source Alice, a destination Bob, N wardens Willies, and
numerous interferers, as depicted in Fig. 1. Wardens seek to
detect any transmission by Alice, and Alice desires to deliver
messages to Bob reliably while guaranteeing a low probability
of being detected by Willies. Alice is equipped with M
antennas while all the other nodes including Bob, Willies,
and the interferers each are single-antenna devices. Consider
two different multi-antenna paradigms, namely, the CAS and
3BobWillie
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Fig. 1: Illustration of a multi-antenna covert communication system. Alice’s
transmit antennas are co-located for the CAS and are deployed at different
places for the DAS (three antennas in both figures). Multiple wardens Willies
move randomly and independently inside a certain region around Bob, and
they aim to detect any transmission by Alice (two wardens within the dashed
circle in the figure). There coexist numerous interferers randomly located in
the network (five interferers in the figure).
DAS, where Alice’s transmit antennas are deployed together
and are dispersed geographically, respectively. Without loss
of generality, Bob is placed at the origin o of the polar
coordinate and the location of Alice’s m-th antenna is denoted
as Lam . In particular, the M antennas for the CAS share the
same position La. Suppose that the N Willies are located
independently and uniformly inside a disc B(o,D) centered
with Bob such that the distribution of their locations {Lw}
follows a binomial point process (BPP) ΦW within B(o,D),
i.e., Lw ∈ ΦW . The interferers are assumed to be scattered
randomly in the network and their locations {Lj} are modeled
as a homogeneous PPP ΦJ with density λJ on the entire two-
dimensional plane, i.e., Lj ∈ ΦJ [26]-[30].
A. Channel Model
All the wireless channels in the network undergo a standard
distance-based path loss along with a frequency flat Rayleigh
fading. The complex channel gains from Alice’sm-th transmit
antenna and from the interferer located at Lj to a receiv-
ing node at Lx are respectively expressed by ham,xr
−α/2
am,x
and hj,xr
−α/2
j,x , where ham,x, hj,x denote the fading coeffi-
cients, ram,x, rj,x denote the corresponding distances, and
α denotes the path-loss exponent. For convenience, define
ha,x , [ha1,x, · · · , haM ,x]T as the fading coefficient vector
from Alice to the receiver at Lx.
Consider a time-slotted system where the locations of all the
nodes and the fading coefficients remain static in a time slot.
Assume that Alice knows perfectly the instantaneous channel
state information of the channel from herself to Bob, i.e., ha,o.
Hence, she can adapt the weight coefficients for her antennas
to boost the received signal strength for Bob. Specifically,
Alice employs MRT and DBF as transmit strategies for the
CAS and DAS, respectively, where the weight coefficient for
the m-th transmit antenna is devised in the form of1
gm =


h†am,o
‖ha,o‖ , CAS,
h†am,o
|ham,o| , DAS.
(1)
When Alice transmits a symbol s[k], the signals received
by Bob and by Willie at Lw, denoted as yo[k] and yw[k],
respectively, are uniformly expressed as
yx[k] = Ux[k] + Vx[k] + zx[k], x ∈ {o, w}, (2)
where Ux[k] =
∑M
m=1
√
Pmgmham,xr
−α/2
am,x s[k] is the
total signal collected from Alice, with Pm being the
transmit power of Alice’s m-th antenna; Vx[k] =∑
Lj∈ΦJ
√
PJhj,xr
−α/2
j,x vj [k] is the aggregate received inter-
ference, with uj [k] and PJ being the signal radiated from
the interferer at Lj and its transmit power, respectively; zx[k]
is the thermal noise at the receiver with variance σ2x. It
is assumed that the transmitted signals s[k], vj [k] and the
fading coefficients ham,x, hj,x are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) with zero mean and unit variance.
B. Detection of Covert Communications
Wardens Willies attempt to judge whether Alice is trans-
mitting or not by performing an optimal statistical hypothesis
test (such as the Neyman-Pearson test [34]) on the observed
sequence {yw[k]}Kk=1 in a communication slot. To this end,
Willies should distinguish two hypotheses, namely, the null
hypothesis H0 meaning that Alice is not transmitting and the
alternate hypothesisH1 indicating an ongoing communication.
The two hypotheses are detailed as below:
H0 : yw[k] = Vw[k] + zw[k], (3)
H1 : yw[k] = Uw[k] + Vw[k] + zw[k]. (4)
Willies’ ultimate goal is to detect whether {yw[k]}Kk=1 comes
from H0 or H1. A correct detection corresponds to either the
acceptance of H0 when it is true or the rejection of H0 when
it is false. The probability of a correct detection is termed
the detection probability. Given that a radiometer is generally
employed in practice for detection, it is assumed here that
Willies adopt the radiometers as their detectors as well. This
assumption is justified in [23]. With a radiometer, the decision
rule is described as below:
P¯w
D1
≷
D0
ξ, (5)
where the test statistic P¯w =
1
K
∑K
k=1 |yw[k]|2 is given
by the average power received by Willie at Lw in a time
slot, and ξ > 0 is a predefined detection threshold for the
detector. D0 and D1 stand for the binary decisions in favor
of H0 and H1, respectively, and decision D0 is made if
P¯w ≤ ξ whereas decision D1 is made otherwise. In this
1Artificial noise is commonly exploited to confuse eavesdroppers in lit-
erature on physical-layer security, e.g., [28]-[31], which however is not
considered for covert communications here. The reason behind is twofold:
allocating part of transmit power for artificial noise will barely change Willie’s
total received power so that it can scarcely improve the covertness due to
the energy detection at Willie side. On the contrary, it will lower the power
available for message delivery, thus degrading the reliability.
4way, the detection probability for Willie at Lw is defined as
pw , P [H0]P [D0|H0]+P [H1]P [D1|H1], where pw = 1 cor-
responds to a perfect detection and on the contrary pw = 0.5
is no better than random guessing. For simplicity, consider
equal a priori probabilities of hypotheses H0 and H1 such
that P [H0] = P [H1] = 0.5.
The detection probability is affected by the uncertainties
from transmitted signals, receiver noise, fading channels, and
node positions. Assume that Willies exploit an infinite number
of signal samples to perform the detection, i.e., K → ∞,
then the uncertainties of transmitted signals and receiver
noise vanish. Consequently, the average received power P¯w
is rewritten as
P¯w =
{
Iw + σ
2
w , H0,
Sw + Iw + σ
2
w, H1,
(6)
where Sw =
∣∣∑M
m=1
√
Pmgmham,wr
−α/2
am,w
∣∣2 and Iw =∑
Lj∈ΦJ PJ |hj,x|2r−αj,x denote the received signal power from
Alice and from the interferers, respectively. Recalling the
decision rule described in (5), the detection probability pw
for certain channel realizations and node locations (i.e., for
given Sw, Iw, and σ
2
w) is calculated as below:
pw =
{
1, Iw + σ
2
w ≤ ξ < Sw + Iw + σ2w,
0.5, otherwise.
(7)
Note that the detection probability pw is either 1 or 0.5,
depending on the setting of detection threshold ξ. Moreover,
if taking into consideration the randomness of Sw and Iw , the
detection probability pw would become a Bernoulli distributed
random variable for any fixed threshold ξ.
C. Performance Metrics
This subsection introduces several metrics which are used
to characterize the performance of the covert communication
system under investigation.
1) Covert Outage Probability: The covert communication
between Alice and Bob fails when it is detected by any Willie,
and then a covert outage event is said to have occurred.
The probability that this event happens is referred to as the
covert outage probability [16], denoted as O, which quantifies
the covertness of the communication. Since the detection
probability pw given in (7) is a Bernoulli random variable,
the covert outage probability O is defined as the probability
that there is at least one Willie having a detection probability
equal to one, i.e.,
O = EΦW
[
P
{ ⋃
Lw∈ΦW
pw = 1
}]
. (8)
Note that the inner probability in (8) is operated over the
random variables Sw and Iw for Lw ∈ ΦW and the outer
expectation is taken over Willies’ random locations {Lw}.
2) Connectivity Probability: Revisit the received signal
yo[k] in (2), and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) of the channel from Alice to Bob is expressed as
γo =
So
Io + σ2o
, (9)
where So =
∣∣∑M
m=1
√
Pmgmham,or
−α/2
am,o
∣∣2 and Io =∑
Lj∈ΦJ PJ |hj,o|2r−αj,o denote the power of the desired signal
from Alice and the aggregate interference power, respectively.
With (9), the achievable rate of Bob is given by Co =
ln(1 + γo) nats/s/Hz. If a target transmission rate R can be
supported, i.e., Co ≥ R, Alice is deemed to be successfully
connected to Bob, and Bob can recover the messages delivered
from Alice. The metric connectivity probability, denoted as C,
is adopted to measure transmission reliability, and is defined
as the probability that the SINR γo is larger than or equal to
the SINR threshold β , eR − 1, as given below:
C = P
{
So
Io + σ2o
≥ β
}
. (10)
3) Covert Throughput: A core metric named covert
throughput, denoted as T , is employed in order to evaluate
the rate efficiency of the covert communication. The covert
throughput is defined as the average successfully transmitted
amount of information per second per Hertz subject to a
covertness requirement O ≤ ǫ, where the threshold ǫ ∈ [0, 1]
represents the maximal acceptable covert outage probability.
Formally, the covert throughput is expressed as the product
of the connectivity probability C and the transmission rate R,
which is described as
T = CR, O ≤ ǫ. (11)
If the covertness constraint O ≤ ǫ is violated, T is set to
zero. The covert throughput defined in (11) would turn into
the well-known secrecy throughput, if the covertness constraint
changes to a secrecy outage probability constraint [35].
The following two sections proceed to the covert throughput
maximization for the CAS and DAS, respectively. Due to
uncoordinated concurrent transmissions by the interferers, the
aggregate interference power at a receiver typically dominates
the noise power. For tractability, an interference-limited net-
work is focused on by ignoring the thermal noise such that
both σ2w in (7) and σ
2
o in (10) are removed. In fact, the obtained
results can be easily generalized to the case with the inclusion
of the thermal noise, which however would only complicate
the analysis but provide no significant qualitative difference.
III. CENTRALIZED ANTENNA SYSTEMS
This section examines the covert communication for the
CAS, where Alice places all her antennas at the same location
La, i.e., (ra,o, θa,o). The total transmit power of Alice is
denoted as PA. Before proceeding to maximizing the covert
throughput, some important insights into the covert outage
probability O and the connectivity probability C are provided.
A. Covert Outage Probability
Based on the detection probability pw in (7), the covert
outage probability O defined in (8) can be interpreted as the
5complement of the probability that all the Willies’ detection
probabilities are less than one, which is reformulated as
O = 1− EΦW
[
P
{ ⋂
Lw∈ΦW
pw < 1
}]
= 1− EΦW
[ ∏
Lw∈ΦW
(1− p¯w)
]
, (12)
where p¯w , P {pw = 1} denotes the average detection proba-
bility for Willie at Lw ∈ ΦW . Note that the second equality in
(12) follows from the assumption that Willies do not collude
with each other such that their detections are independent.
Before computing O, it is needed to calculate p¯w, which can
be obtained from (7) by averaging over the random variables
Sw and Iw, i.e.,
p¯w = P{Iw ≤ ξ < Sw + Iw} = FIw (ξ)−FSw+Iw (ξ)
= FIw(ξ)−
∫ ξ
0
FIw (ξ − x)fSw(x)dx, (13)
where Sw = PA
|hHa,oha,w |2
‖ha,o‖2 r
−α
a,w. It is verified that Sw is
exponentially distributed with fSw(x) =
rαa,w
PA
e−r
α
a,wx/PA [28]
which is independent of M . In other words, there is no
statistical difference from the performance of Willie whether
Alice uses a single antenna or multiple antennas when Alice
adopts MRT. Hence, adding transmit antennas will exert no
impact on the covert outage probability as long as the total
transmit power is fixed. As the interferers’ locations are
modeled by a homogeneous PPP, the aggregate interference Iw
is the shot noise [36]. Generally, FIw (x) only can be displayed
in an infinite series [36], which causes a high computational
complexity to calculate p¯w. In order to mitigate the calculation
burden, the Laplace transform of Iw is invoked.
Lemma 1 ([24, Eqn. (8)]): The Laplace transform of Iw
evaluated at s is given by
LIw (s) = EIw
[
e−sIw
]
= e−κλJP
δ
J s
δ
, (14)
where δ = 2/α, κ , πΓ(1 + δ)Γ(1 − δ), and Γ(z) is the
gamma function [37, Eqn. (8.310.1)].
With the aid of Lemma 1 together with a widely used
approximation approach [38], a closed-form expression for
FIw(x) is provided by the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The CDF FIw (x) is approximated by
FIw(x) ≈
L∑
l=1
(
L
l
)
(−1)l+1e−κλJP δJ ( lτx )
δ
, (15)
where τ , L(L!)−1/L and L is the number of terms applied
for the approximation.
Proof 1: FIw(x) is calculated as follows,
FIw(x) = P {Iw ≤ x} = P {Iw/x ≤ 1}
(a)≈ P {Iw/x ≤ ι}
(b)
/ 1− EIw
[(
1− e−τIw/x
)L]
, (16)
where the dummy variable ι introduced in (a) is a normalized
gamma random variable with the shape parameter L, and (a)
follows from the fact that ι converges to one as L approaches
infinity [38]; (b) yields a tight upper bound by invoking
Alzer’s inequality [39], i.e., P{ι ≥ z} / 1 − [1− e−ξz]L for
a constant z > 0. Using the binomial expansion with (16) and
plugging the Laplace transform LIw (s) in (14) with s = lτ/x
completes the proof.
Substituting the approximated CDF FIw (x) into (13), the
following theorem is obtained.
Theorem 1: The average detection probability p¯w in (13) is
approximated by
p¯w ≈
L∑
l=1
(
L
l
)
(−1)l+1
[
e−κλJP
δ
J( lτξ )
δ
− e−
rαa,wξ
PA Zl(ξ, α)
]
,
(17)
where Zl(ξ, α) =
rαa,w
PA
∫ ξ
0
e−κλJP
δ
J (lτ/y)
δ+rαa,wy/PAdy with τ
and L defined in Lemma 2.
The expression of the approximate p¯w in (17) is simple and
practically closed-form which requires only the computation
or lookup of a Zl(ξ, α) value. For a special case with α = 4,
a closed-form expression for the PDF of Iw is found in [40],
which is rewritten below:
fIw(x) =
π3/2λJ
√
PJ
4x3/2
e−
pi4λ2JPJ
16x . (18)
With (18), the CDF FIw(x) is simplified as
FIw (x) =
∫ x
0
fIw(x)dx = 1− erf
(
π2λJ
√
PJ
4
√
x
)
, (19)
where erf(z) is the error function [37, Eqn. (8.250.1)]. Plug-
ging (19) into (13) yields
p¯α=4w = e
−Bξ
[
1 +
∫ ξ
0
erf
(
A√
y
)
BeBydy
]
− erf
(
A√
ξ
)
,
(20)
where A = π2λJ
√
PJ/4 and B = r
4
a,w/PA. The correctness
of the exact p¯w given in (20) is confirmed by Monte-Carlo
simulation results as shown in Fig. 2.2 Moreover, the approx-
imations derived in (17) coincide well with (20) when L = 5
is chosen.
Having obtained p¯w, the covert outage probability O is
derived in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The covert outage probability for the CAS is
given by
O = 1−
(∫ 2pi
0
∫ D
0
(1− p¯w) r
πD2
drdθ
)N
, (21)
where the parameter ra,w in p¯w is expressed as ra,w =√
r2a,o + r
2 − 2ra,or cos(θa,o − θ).
Proof 2: Note that the distribution of the N wardens’
locations obeys a BPP. Due to the i.i.d. property of a BPP,
2The simulation results are obtained by using 100,000 trails. Each trial
distributes Ni interferers uniformly as a BPP inside a sufficiently large square
area Sj = [−Lj Lj ]
2, where Ni is a Poisson random variable with mean
4λJL
2
j . All the channel fading coefficients are generated to be i.i.d. complex
Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance. The received signal power Sw and
interference power Iw are computed from (6). Finally, the average detection
probability p¯w is computed by counting the number of times the event Iw ≤
ξ < Sw + Iw in (13) happens.
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Fig. 2: p¯w vs. ξ for different L’s, with PA = 30 dBm, λJ = 0.1, and
ra,w = 1. Other parameters are specified in Sec. V.
the covert outage probability O given in (12) is equivalently
transformed to
O = 1−
N∏
n=1
Era,w [1− p¯w]
= 1−
N∏
n=1
∫ 2pi
0
∫ D
0
(1− p¯w) frw,o,θw,o(r, θ)drdθ, (22)
where frw,o,θw,o(r, θ) =
r
piD2 and substituting it into (22)
completes the proof.
Although (21) involves two nested integrals, the integral
interval is finite and thus the integral is practically not difficult
to be numerically evaluated.
B. Optimal Detection Threshold from Willie’s Viewpoint
From a robust design perspective, the worst case of the
covert communication between Alice and Bob is examined.
In particular, the optimal detection threshold ξ is designed
from Willie’s point of view which results in a maximal covert
outage probability O. In addition, the worst-case covert com-
munication scenario should consider each Willie can adjust
his detection threshold based on the distance between himself
and Alice for improving detection accuracy.
Since O in (21) increases with p¯w, to maximize O only
requires to maximize p¯w for each realization of Willie’s
location Lw. Theoretically, neither a too small nor a too large
detection threshold ξ is beneficial for detection, and there is
an optimal ξ that yields a maximal p¯w. Besides, this property
should be irrelevant to the path-loss exponent α. Hence, for
mathematical tractability, only the special case with α = 4 is
considered, and the following theorem provides the optimal
detection threshold ξ that maximizes p¯α=4w .
Theorem 3: The average detection probability p¯α=4w in (20)
initially increases and then decreases with the threshold ξ; the
maximal p¯α=4w is achieved at ξ = ξo and is given by
p¯α=4w,max = AB
−1e−
A2
ξo /
√
πξ3o , (23)
where ξo is the unique root of ξ > 0 to the following equation,
Ae−
A2
ξ /
√
πξ3 −Be−BξY (ξ) +Berf(A/
√
ξ) = 0, (24)
with A and B defined in (20), and Y (ξ) = 1 +∫ ξ
0 erf
(
A/
√
y
)
BeBydy.
Proof 3: Please refer to Appendix A.
The first-increasing-then-decreasing trend of p¯w with re-
spect to (w.r.t.) ξ is validated in Fig. 2. Let Y1(ξ) denote the
left-hand side of (24) such that Y1(ξo) = 0. As Appendix A
indicates, Y1(ξ) is first positive and then negative as ξ grows
from zero to infinity, then ξo can be efficiently calculated via
a bisection search with (24). Using the derivative rule for
implicit functions [28] with Y1(ξo) = 0 yields the derivative
dξo
dA = − ∂Y1(ξo)/∂A∂Y1(ξo)/∂ξo > 0, namely, ξo increases with A.
Likewise, ξo decreases with B. Since A =
pi2λJ
√
PJ
4 and
B =
r4a,w
PA
, it is inferred that ξo increases with λJ , PJ , and
PA. This suggests that Willie would enlarge the detection
threshold when the interferer density, the interfering power,
or Alice’s transmit power increases, since only in this way
can Willies distinguish Alice’s signals from the interference
more accurately. It is easy to confirm that the above properties
regarding ξo for α = 4 are still valid for more general cases
in which the optimal detection threshold can be obtained via
an exhaustive search.
Although it is rather troublesome to exhibit p¯w,max explic-
itly with PA due to the implicit form of ξo, the monotonicity
of p¯w,max w.r.t. PA is still revealed by the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The maximal average detection probability
p¯w,max for the worst-case covert communication monotoni-
cally increases with Alice’s transmit power PA.
Proof 4: Consider Alice’s transmit power PA,1 and PA,2
with PA,2 > PA,1, and let ξo,1 and ξo,2 be the optimal
detection thresholds maximizing p¯w for PA,1 and PA,2, re-
spectively. When PA increases, Sw increases and then the
feasible region of ξ, i.e., [Iw , Sw + Iw), is enlarged. Hence,
p¯w(PA,2, ξo,2) ≥ p¯w(PA,2, ξo,1) > p¯w(PA,1, ξo,1), where the
second inequality holds since p¯w increases with PA for a
constant ξ as shown in (13). This completes the proof.
Fig. 3 illustrates how the average detection probability p¯w
is affected by the interferer density λJ and Alice’s transmit
power PA. The optimal detection threshold ξo is shown to
significantly improve p¯w compared with a constant ξ. It is
observed that p¯w increases with PA and decreases with λJ
when the optimal ξo is used for detectors. This demonstrates
the harmfulness of high transmit power for covert commu-
nications, whereas the covertness performance indeed can be
improved by introducing co-channel interference. Moreover,
the monotonicity of the optimal ξo w.r.t. λJ or PA is also
confirmed in Fig. 3 (see the circle dots in the figure).
C. Connectivity Probability
A closed-form expression for the exact connectivity proba-
bility C in (10) is provide below.
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Fig. 3: p¯w vs. λJ for different PA’s, with ra,w = 1.
Theorem 4: The connectivity probability for the CAS is
given by
C = e−φβδ + e−φβδ
M−1∑
m=1
1
m!
m∑
n=1
(
δφβδ
)n
Υm,n, (25)
with Υm,n =
∑
ψj∈C(m−1m−n)
∏
lij∈ψj
i=1,··· ,m−n
[lij − δ(lij − i+ 1)]
and φ , κλJP δJ r
2
a,o/P
δ
A. The term C
(
m−1
m−n
)
denotes the set of
all distinct subsets ψj of the natural numbers {1, 2, · · · ,m−
1} with cardinality m − n. The elements in each subset are
arranged in an ascending order with lij being the i-th element
of ψj . For m ≥ 1, it is set Υm,m = 1.
Proof 5: Let s ,
rαa,oβ
PA
, and C in (10) is calculated as
follows:
C = EIo [P {So ≥ βIo}] = EIo
[
P
{‖ha,o‖2 ≥ sIo}]
(c)
= EIo
[
e−sIo
M−1∑
m=0
smImo
m!
]
=
M−1∑
m=0
EIo
[
sme−sIo
m!
Imo
]
(d)
=
M−1∑
m=0
[
(−s)m
m!
dmLIo(s)
dsm
]
, (26)
where (c) holds since ‖ha,o‖2 is a normalized gamma ran-
dom variable with the shape parameter M and (d) is due
to
(−1)mdmLIo (s)
dsm = EIo
[
Imo e
−sIo], where LIo(s) has the
same form as LIw (s) in (14). Substituting (14) into (26) and
invoking [41, Theorem 1] complete the proof.
The correctness of Theorem 4 is validated by Fig. 7 in
Sec. V. The first part e−φβ
δ
in C arises from a single an-
tenna, and the second part is attributed to the deployment
of multiple antennas. If adding one more antenna, C in-
creases 1M !
∑M
n=1
(
δφβδ
)n
ΥM,n, but the increment becomes
insignificant when M is sufficiently large. This implies, it is
unnecessary to employ antennas excessively, and a favorable
reliability still can be achieved.
D. Covert Throughput Maximization
This subsection optimizes the covert throughput T = CR
subject to a covert outage probability constraint O ≤ ǫ. The
optimization problem is formulated as follows:
max
PA>0,R>0
T = CR, s.t. O ≤ ǫ. (27)
Since C is a function of both PA and R but O is independent
of R, in order to maximize T , the following equivalent
transformation is carried on according to [42, Sec. 4.1.3],
max
PA>0,R>0
C(PA, R)R = max
R>0
(
R max
PA>0
C(PA, R)
)
. (28)
This transformation decomposes the primary problem (27) into
two steps: first maximizing C over PA constrained by O ≤ ǫ
with a fixed R, and then maximizing T = CR over R. In what
follows, the optimization procedure is performed step by step.
1) Optimal PA: Since both C and O increase with PA,
the optimal P ∗A maximizing C is the maximal PA satisfying
O(PA) ≤ ǫ, which is P ∗A = Pmax , O−1(ǫ), where
O−1(ǫ) denotes the inverse function of O(PA). The following
corollary develops some properties regarding Pmax.
Corollary 2: The maximal transmit power Pmax is inde-
pendent of the number of transmit antennas M , increases
with the covert outage probability threshold ǫ, decreases with
the number of wardens N , and is proportional to λ
α/2
J PJ ,
i.e., Pmax ∝ λα/2J PJ , where λJ and PJ are the density of
interferers and the interfering power, respectively.
Proof 6: Please refer to Appendix B.
Corollary 2 suggests that, in order to confront more wardens
or achieve a smaller covert outage probability, a lower transmit
power should be chosen. However, after introducing multiple
antennas or random interference, it is feasible to guarantee the
same level of covertness with a higher transmit power while
reaping a reliability gain.
2) Optimal R: Having acquired the optimal transmit power
P ∗A, this step determines the optimal transmission rate R
∗ that
maximizes the covert throughput T = C(P ∗A)R. Due to the
complicated expression of C in (25), it is difficult to prove the
monotonicity of T w.r.t. R. However, it is intuitive that either
a too large or a too small R will not yield a large T , and the
optimal R∗ can be obtained via an exhaustive search, which
is given by
R∗ = argmax
R>0
C(P ∗A)R. (29)
The Diophantus equation in (25) makes C(P ∗A) time-
consuming to calculate and complicated to analyze. In order
to circumvent such a difficulty and facilitate the subsequent
optimization, a practical requirement of high reliability is con-
sidered and a computational convenient suboptimal solution
to problem (29) is further provided. In particular, focusing on
the large connectivity probability regime C → 1, the following
lemma gives a compact expression for C.
Lemma 3: In the large connectivity probability regime C →
1, C in (25) is approximated by
C ≈ (1 +Kα,Mφβδ) e−φβδ , (30)
where Kα,M = δ
∑M−1
m=1 (1/m!)
∏m−1
l=1 (l − δ).
8Proof 7: As φ → 0 ⇒ C → 1, discarding the high-order
terms Θ
(
φ2
)
in (25) yields (30).
Note that φ → 0 reflects all cases of parameters including
but not limited to ra,o, λJ , PJ , and PA which may produce a
sufficiently large C. With (30), problem (29) is recast as below:
max
β>0
To(β) ,
(
1 +Kα,Mφoβ
δ
)
e−φoβ
δ
ln(1 + β), (31)
where φo , κλJP δJ r
2
a,o/P
δ
max. The solution to (31) is pro-
vided by the following theorem.
Theorem 5: To(β) in (31) is a first-increasing-then-
decreasing function of β, and the optimal βo maximizing
To(β) is the unique root of β > 0 to the equation Q(β) = 0
with Q(β) given by
Q(β) =
1 +Kα,Mφoβ
δ
1 + β
− ln(1 + β)
[
1 +Kα,M (φoβ
δ − 1)]
δ−1φ−1o β1−δ
.
(32)
Proof 8: Please refer to Appendix C.
Appendix C shows that Q(β) in (32) initially is positive and
then becomes negative as β grows from zero to infinity. Hence,
the optimal βo can be efficiently calculated via a bisection
method with the equation Q(β) = 0, which is quite time-
saving compared with the exhaustive search. More importantly,
some useful properties concerning βo are well preserved in
the equation Q(β) = 0 and can be easily extracted by the
following corollary.
Corollary 3: The optimal βo satisfying Q(βo) = 0 decreases
with φo and increases with Kα,M .
Proof 9: The proof is completed by proving dβodφo < 0 and
dβo
dKα,M
> 0 using the derivative rule for implicit functions
with Q(βo) = 0 [28].
With the aid of Corollaries 2 and 3, various insights into the
behavior of the optimal rate Ro = ln(1+βo) and the resultant
maximal covert throughput To = C(P ∗A, βo)Ro are developed.
Proposition 1: The optimal rate Ro and the maximal covert
throughput To increase with the number of transmit antennas
M and the covert outage probability threshold ǫ, decrease with
the distance between Alice and Bob ra,o and the number of
wardens N , and are invariant to the density of interferers λJ
and the interfering power PJ , irrespective of M .
Proof 10: Please refer to Appendix D.
Proposition 1 captures an inherent contradiction between
improving throughput and covertness for covert communica-
tions. Fortunately, multi-antenna techniques enable to achieve
high throughput and covertness simultaneously. Moreover,
the invariance property w.r.t. λJ and PJ implies that, even
facing ubiquitous interference, a superior balance between the
requirements of throughput and covertness still can be struck
by properly designing the transmit power.
Remark 1: The above invariance property is consistent with
that observed in [23] which discussed single-antenna covert
communications against random interferers and a deterministic
warden. This paper extends the work of [23] to the multi-
antenna scenario with random wardens. Various new findings
are obtained compared with [23]. In particular, the covert
throughput is severely degraded when more wardens are
deployed whereas can be markedly ameliorated by equipping
more transmit antennas. Numerical results show that the
proposed design scheme attains a significant throughput gain
than that of [23], by relaxing the constraint of reliability.
Remark 2: The invariance property is valid for the
interference-limited system and meanwhile the maximal trans-
mit power Pmax can be adjusted proportionally to λ
α/2
J PJ . If
the transmit power PA is not allowed to exceed a power bud-
get, denoted as Pbud, then for a large λJ or PJ which yields
Pmax > Pbud, the above invariance property is compromised
and To becomes decreasing with λJ and PJ . Nevertheless, the
power budget constraint is beyond the scope of this paper.
IV. DISTRIBUTED ANTENNA SYSTEM
This section optimizes the covert throughput for the
DAS, where Alice deploys the m-th antenna at Lam , i.e.,
(ram,o, θam,o), with a transmit power PDm . Since these
geographically spread antennas are connected to a central
processor, Alice is capable to enable them to deliver the
same message simultaneously to Bob through DBF to enhance
transmission reliability.
A. Worst-case Covert Outage Probability
The covert outage probability O for the DAS shares the
same form as (12), where the average detection probability
p¯w is calculated as (13). The only difference lies in the
power of signals received from Alice, which changes to
Sw =
∣∣∣∣∑Mm=1√PDm h†am,o|ham,o|ham,wr−α/2am,w
∣∣∣∣
2
here and is ex-
ponentially distributed with mean
∑M
m=1 PDmr
−α
am,w. Finally,
O is obtained as (21) with p¯w given in (17), only requiring to
revise the term PAr
−α
a,w in (17) to
∑M
m=1 PDmr
−α
am,w.
The optimal detection thresholds ξ for Willies’ detectors for
the worst-case covert communication is obtained in a similar
way for the CAS. Specifically, for the special case with α = 4,
the optimal ξ for Willie at Lw that leads to a maximal p¯w is
determined as given in Theorem 3, simply with B in (24)
replaced with 1/
(∑M
m=1 PDmr
−4
am,w
)
.
It is worth noting that the independence between O and
M for the CAS no longer holds for the DAS, and adding
transmit antennas surprisingly exacerbates the covertness as
will be certified in Sec. V. The reason behind is, the distributed
antennas are more vulnerable to the detection by Willies
who are randomly located in the network. Nevertheless, it is
inferred that such deterioration will gradually vanish, and O
will eventually approach a constant asM becomes sufficiently
large. For instance, it is easily verified that, the received
power from an ocean of antennas arranged on a circle with
transmit power PAM is equal to that from a single antenna
randomly distributed on the same circle with power PA, i.e.,
limM→∞ PAM
∑M
m=1 r
−α
am,w = PA
∫ 2pi
0
r−αa,w
2pi dθ.
B. Connectivity Probability
Revisiting the connectivity probability C defined in (10), So
for the DAS is given by So =
∣∣∑M
m=1
√
PDm |ham,o|r−α/2am,o
∣∣2
which appears as the squared sum of independent and non-
identically distributed Rayleigh random variables, rather than
9a gamma random variable for the CAS. This transition enor-
mously complicates the computation of C. Fortunately, an
integral form for the exact C for the DAS is provided by the
following theorem.
Theorem 6: The connectivity probability for the DAS is
given by
C = 1−
∫
V
ψ2e
−κψ0βδ
ψM1
M∑
n=1
(
δκψ0β
δ
)n
ΥM,ndv1, · · · , dvM ,
(33)
where the domain of integration V is described as {V :
v1 ≥ 0, · · · , vM ≥ 0,
∑M
m=1 vm < 1}, ψ0 = λJP δJψδ1,
ψ1 =
∑M
m=1
rαam,ov
2
m
PDm
, ψ2 =
∏M
m=1
2rαam,ovm
PDm
, and ΥM,n is
defined in Theorem 4.
Proof 11: Please refer to Appendix E.
The exactness of (33) is verified in the simulation section.
Although the monotonicity of C w.r.t. PDm and β is not
explicitly reflected in (33) due to the multiple integral, it still
can be concluded that C increases with PDm and decreases
with β from the definition given in (10). As done for the
CAS, the large connectivity probability regime where C → 1
is considered, followed by a more concise expression for C
given in the following corollary.
Corollary 4: In the large connectivity probability regime, C
in (33) is approximated by
C ≈1−Wβδ, (34)
where W , δκλJP δJΥM,1
∫
V ψ
δ−M
1 ψ2dv1, · · · , dvM is inde-
pendent of β.
Proof 12: The result follows easily by considering ψ0 → 0
in (33).
Note that C in (34) becomes a linear decreasing function of
λJ , P
δ
J , and β
δ , respectively. This greatly simplifies the design
of transmit power and transmission rate for covert throughput
maximization, as will be detailed in the next subsection.
C. Covert Throughput Maximization
This subsection addresses the problem of maximizing the
covert throughput T = CR subject to a covertness constraint
O ≤ ǫ for the DAS. The problem is formulated similarly
as (27) and can be resolved by executing the same two-step
process for the CAS described in Sec. III-D.
Generally, the optimal transmit power PDm , for m =
1, · · · ,M , should be jointly determined based on the dis-
tances ram,o. However, this is intractable since O and C
are coupled with PDm in an extremely sophisticated way.
Motivated by the fact that Alice is absolutely unaware of
the locations of both the interferrers and Willies, a plausible
special case is examined, where the M antennas are deployed
at a same distance from Bob and with equal transmit power,
i.e., PDm = PD , for m = 1, · · · ,M . In this case, the optimal
PD that maximizes C for a fixed R is equal to the maximal
PD satisfying O ≤ ǫ, i.e., P ∗D = O−1(ǫ). Subsequently, the
optimal R∗ that maximizes T = C(P ∗D)R can be exhaustively
searched as R∗ = argmaxR>0 C(P ∗D)R.
The following part seeks an easy-to-compute suboptimal Ro
by considering the large connectivity probability regime with
C given in (34). The problem is described as
max
β>0
To(β) ,
(
1−Wβδ) ln(1 + β), (35)
with the solution provided by the following theorem.
Theorem 7: To(β) in (35) first increases and then decreases
with β, and reaches the maximum at β = βo, where βo is the
unique zero-crossing β > 0 of the following derivative:
dTo(β)
dβ
=
1−Wβδ
1 + β
−Wδβδ−1 ln(1 + β). (36)
Proof 13: Please refer to Appendix F.
As shown in Appendix F,
dT (β)
dβ is initially positive and
then negative as β increases from zero to W−1/δ, then βo can
be rapidly searched via a bisection method with
dT (β)
dβ = 0.
Moreover, invoking the derivative rule for implicit functions
with
dT (βo)
dβo
= 0, dβodW is proved to be negative. Similar to the
CAS, it is proved that the maximal transmit power P ∗D for the
DAS is proportional to the term λ
α/2
J PJ , i.e., P
∗
D ∝ λα/2J PJ .
Hence, the optimal transmission rate R∗ and the maximal
covert throughput T ∗ are invariant to λJ and PJ , regardless
of the value of M .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents simulation results to verify the theo-
retical findings. Without loss of generality, for the CAS Alice’s
M antennas are placed at the same location La = (1, 0) with a
unit distance from Bob at the origin o. For a fair comparison,
the M antennas for the DAS are arranged uniformly on
the circle B(o, 1) such that the m-th antenna is located at
Lam = (1, 2π(m − 1)/M). Moreover, equal total transmit
power is considered for the two systems and equal power
allocation is assumed among the antennas for the DAS such
that PDm = PD = PA/M , for m = 1, · · · ,M . Throughout
the experiments, some parameters are set fixed such that α = 4
and PJ = 30 dBm.
Fig. 4 plots the average detection probability p¯w of an
arbitrary Willie with different locations Lw. Whether the CAS
or DAS is superior in terms of covertness depends heavily
on Willie’s location. Bear the locations of Alice’s transmit
antennas in mind, it is observed that when Willie stays closer
to the co-located antennas than to the distributed ones (see
the two figures above), the DAS provides a higher level of
covertness (i.e., a smaller p¯w). Conversely, as Willie moves
far away from the co-located antennas but approaches one
or more distributed antennas (see the two figures below), the
CAS produces a smaller p¯w and is more beneficial for covert
communications.
Fig. 5 depicts the covert outage probability O with different
detection radius D and transmit power PA. Although the
DAS achieves a lower average detection probability than that
of the CAS when Willie resides inside certain regions (as
shown in Fig. 4), the CAS can invariably offer a smaller
O compared with the DAS. The underlying reason is that
the distributed deployment of transmit antennas is a double-
edged sword for covert communications. On one hand, it
10
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Fig. 4: Average detection probability p¯w vs. Willie’s location Lw =
(rw,o, θw,o), with PA = 30 dBm, λJ = 0.1, and M = 4.
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Fig. 5: Covert outage probability O vs. detection radius D for different PA’s,
with λJ = 0.1, M = 4, and N = 2.
lowers the transmit power for each antenna, which indeed
hampers Willie’s detection. On the other hand, since Willie can
appear anywhere in the network, the geographically scattered
antennas also increase the possibility of offering Willie a
larger aggregate power, which unfortunately outweighs the
advantage of the reduced transmit power. Therefore, when
Willies’ movement is completely uninformed, the CAS is more
rewarding for covert communications. It is also observed that
there exists an optimal D∗ leading to a maximal O, and the
value of D∗ is slightly larger than the distance between Alice
and Bob (ra,o = 1 in this figure). Besides, as indicated by
Corollary 1, O increases with PA as a higher transmit power
makes the detection easier.
Fig. 6 shows how multiple antennas affect the covert outage
probabilityO (left figure) and Alice’s maximal transmit power
P ∗A satisfying O ≤ ǫ (right figure), respectively. In the left
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Fig. 6: Left figure: O vs. M , with λJ = 0.1 and PA = 20 dBm; Right
figure: P ∗
A
vs. M , with D = 2, N = 2, and ǫ = 0.3.
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Fig. 7: C vs. λJ for different M ’s, with PA = 30 dBm.
figure, O remains constant with M for the CAS since the
power perceived at Willie is equivalent to that from a single-
antenna transmitter when Alice adopts MRT. For the DAS,
O increases with M and reaches a plateau for a sufficiently
large M , as explained in Sec. IV-A. It is as expected that
O decreases with the detection radius D > 1 and increases
with the warden number N . The two curves marked with
circles and asterisks share the same density of wardens, i.e.,
N
piD2 =
1
2pi , but the latter gives a larger O. This implies,
narrowing down the detection range while with fewer wardens
might be more effective for detection then deploying more
wardens in an expanded detection region. The right figure
reveals that P ∗A achieved for the CAS is independent of M ,
whereas that for the DAS decreases withM . This substantiates
the disadvantage of the distributed antennas. Moreover, P ∗A for
both systems increases with the interferer density λJ , which
demonstrates the benefit of coexisting interferers for covert
communications.
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Fig. 7 plots the connectivity probability C with different
densities of interferers λJ and numbers of transmit antennas
M . Monte-Carlo simulation results match well with the the-
oretical values. The approximations derived in (30) and (34)
approach closely to the exact values in (25) and (33) for quite
a wide range of C, respectively. This affirms the rationality of
considering the large C regime for designing the optimal rate.
It is found that C increases with M for both systems, and the
gap between them is nearly negligible. This is because, both
systems take full advantage of the spatial degrees of freedom
and enable coherent superposition of signals at the destination.
Fig. 8 shows that the covert throughput T for both the
CAS and DAS first increases and then decreases with the
transmission rate R, as proved in Theorems 5 and 7. This is
because, as R continues to increase, the connectivity probabil-
ity C becomes quite small, thus leading to a low T = CR. It
is found that the optimal R yields a peak throughput much
higher than that under a constant R without optimization.
This highlights the significance of the designs. As stated in
Proposition 1, the optimal R increases with the covert outage
probability threshold ǫ and the number of transmit antennas
M . The basic cause is that, as ǫ (also the maximal P ∗A) or
M increases, C rises and as a consequence a larger R can be
supported. When adding a single antenna, the CAS achieves
a pronounced throughput improvement whereas the DAS only
attains an insignificant gain. The main reason behind lies in
the loss of the maximal transmit power for the DAS after
guaranteeing the covertness requirement, as shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 9 compares the CAS and DAS in terms of covert
throughput T for different numbers of transmit antennas
M . The covert throughput obtained in [23] is examined
as the benchmark performance in which an extra reliabil-
ity requirement C ≥ ̺ is imposed. It is found that the
throughput of the suboptimal scheme approach closely to
that of the optimal scheme for comparatively few transmit
antennas, and both schemes achieve a remarkable throughput
gain than that from [23]. The fundamental reason is that,
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Fig. 9: T ∗ vs. M for different ̺’s and λJ ’s, with D = 2, N = 2, and
ǫ = 0.3.
by permitting a slight sacrifice of reliability, a prominent
throughput improvement can be gained. Moreover, the CAS
offers an outstanding superiority over the DAS, especially for
a fairly large M . This suggests, the CAS should be a priority
for covert communications in random networks. From the
dashed lines in this figure, it is observed that T remains
unchanged w.r.t. the density of interferers λJ . This validates
the invariance property stated in Proposition 1. It is explained
as follows: the concomitant interferers can effectively hinder
the detection, thus enabling a higher transmit power while not
compromising on the covertness requirement; the increase of
transmit power in return can neutralize well the adverse impact
of the interference on throughput performance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The potential of multi-antenna systems for covert commu-
nications in random networks is examined. Considering the
worst-case covert communication where the wardens employ
optimal detection thresholds for their detectors, the covert
throughput is maximized by successively adjusting the trans-
mit power and the transmission rate. An interesting invariance
property is revealed for both the CAS and DAS, which states
that, whatever the number of transmit antennas is, the maximal
covert throughput is not impacted by the density of interferers.
Numerical results indicate that the CAS is more favorable
to the covert communication for random networks than the
DAS, particularly when a large number of transmit antennas
are deployed.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 3
Rewrite (20) as a function of ξ given below:
p¯w(ξ) = −erf(A/
√
ξ) + e−BξY (ξ). (37)
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Then, the derivative
dp¯w(ξ)
dξ is given by
dp¯w(ξ)
dξ
= Ae−
A2
ξ /
√
πξ3 −Be−BξY (ξ) +Berf(A/
√
ξ),
(38)
which is due to
dY (ξ)
dξ = Be
Bξerf
(
A/
√
ξ
)
. Note that
dp¯w(ξ)
dξ |ξ=0 = Ae−A
2/ξ/
√
πξ3 > 0 and dp¯w(ξ)dξ |ξ→∞ →
−Be−BξY (ξ) < 0, which implies there is at least one zero-
crossing of
dp¯w(ξ)
dξ . Denote an arbitrary one as ξo such that
dp¯w(ξ)
dξ |ξ=ξo = 0, and substituting it into (38) yields
Be−BξoY (ξo) = Berf(A/
√
ξo) +Ae
−A2
ξo /
√
πξ3o . (39)
With (39) in mind, the second derivative
d2p¯w(ξ)
dξ2 at ξ = ξo is
given by
d2p¯w(ξ)
dξ2
|ξ=ξo = Ae−
A2
ξo
(
A2 − 3ξo/2
)
/
√
πξ7o . (40)
The sign of
d2p¯w(ξ)
dξ2 |ξ=ξo is solely determined by the term
A2 − 32ξo. The uniqueness of the zero-crossing of dp¯w(ξ)/dξ
is proved below by contradiction.
Suppose there are K > 1 zero-crossing points of dp¯w(ξ)dξ
sorted as 0 < ξo,1 ≤ ξo,2 ≤ · · · ≤ ξo,K . Since dp¯w(ξ)dξ |ξ=0 >
0, the first (i.e., the minimal) zero-crossing ξo,1 must satisfy
d2p¯w(ξ)
dξ2 |ξ=ξo,1 < 0, which yields A2 − 32ξo,1 < 0. Otherwise,
ξo,1 never exists. Evidently, for any k > 1, A
2 − 32ξo,k < 0
and
d2p¯w(ξ)
dξ2 |ξ=ξo,k < 0 hold as ξo,k ≥ ξo,1. This indicates,
dp¯w(ξ)
dξ initially is positive and then becomes negative after ξ
exceeds ξo,1. In other words, there is only one zero-crossing
of
dp¯w(ξ)
dξ , denoted as ξo, which is the solution that maximizes
p¯w(ξ) and can be calculated by setting
dp¯w(ξ)
dξ in (38) to zero.
Substituting the optimal ξo satisfying (39) into (20) completes
the proof.
B. Proof of Corollary 2
The first three properties are proved by noting that O re-
mains constant withM , increases with PA, and decreases with
N , respectively. Since O is independent ofM , the fourth prop-
erty can be proved similarly as [23, Theorem 1] for a single-
antenna transmitter. However, the proof for [23, Theorem 1]
is incomplete, since only the sufficient condition is provided.
The proof is simplified here by taking the special case α = 4
as an example. Recalling p¯w,max in (23) with A ∝ λJ
√
PJ
and B ∝ 1/PA, it is proved that if a group {A1, PA,1, ξo,1} =
{A0, P0, ξ0} yields p¯w,max = η ∈ [0, 1], then an arbitrary
group {A2, PA,2, ξo,2} =
{
̟A0, ̟
2P0, ̟
2ξ0
}
for ̟ > 0
also produces p¯w,max = η. The necessity of PA,2 = ̟
2P0
for satisfying p¯w,max = η when A2 = ̟A0 is further verified
by the monotonicity of p¯w,max w.r.t. PA shown in Corollary
1. That means A2/PA = λ
2
JPJ/PA maintains invariant w.r.t.
λJ and PJ on the premise of p¯w,max = η. Since O in (22)
increases with p¯w, the invariance property given above is also
valid for PA = Pmax with O(Pmax) = ǫ, i.e., Pmax ∝ λ2JPJ .
C. Proof of Theorem 5
The derivative of To(β) w.r.t. β is calculated from (31),
which is
dTo(β)
dβ = e
−φoβδQ(β), where Q(β) is defined in
(32). It is easy to show that
dTo(β)
dβ |β=0 = 1 > 0 and
dTo(β)
dβ |β→∞ < 0. Hence, at least one zero-crossing of dTo(β)dβ
exists. Denote an arbitrary one as βo such that e
−φoβδoQ(βo) =
0 which further yields Q(βo) = 0. The second derivative
d2To(β)
dβ2 at β = βo is computed as
d2To(β)
dβ2
|β=βo = e−φoβ
δ
o
dQ(β)
dβ
|β=βo
=
δe−φoβ
δ
o
1 + βo
[
1 +Kα,Mφoβ
δ
o
δ(1 + βo)
(
1− βo
ln(1 + βo)
)
−1− Kα,Mφoβ
δ
o(1 +Kα,Mφoβ
δ
o)
1 +Kα,M (φoβδo − 1)
]
. (41)
It is known that 1 +Kα,M (φoβ
δ
o − 1) > 0 from Q(βo) = 0.
Plugging this inequality with βo > ln(1+βo) into (41) yields
d2To(β)
dβ2 |β=βo < 0, which indicates that To(β) first increases
with β and then decreases after β exceeds βo. Hence, βo is
the optimal β that maximizes To(β).
D. Proof of Proposition 1
Note that Kα,M = δ
∑M−1
m=1 (1/m!)
∏m
l=1(l − δ) increases
with M and φo = κλJP
δ
J r
2
a,o/P
δ
max decreases with Pmax.
As indicated by Corollary 2, Pmax increases with ǫ, decreases
with N , and is independent of M . Invoking Corollary 3, it
is proved that βo increases with M and ǫ and decreases with
ra,o and N , respectively. Next, as shown in Corollary 2 that
Pmax ∝ λα/2J PJ , it is known that φo does not change with
λJ and PJ . Therefore, the optimal βo is independent of λJ
and PJ . For the maximal To, the monotonicity w.r.t. these
parameters is the same as the monotonicity of C w.r.t. them.
It is easy to prove that C increases with M and ǫ, decreases
with ra,o and N , and remains unchanged with λJ and PJ ,
respectively. This completes the proof.
E. Proof of Theorem 6
Let So =
(∑M
m=1Xm
)2
with Xm =
√
PDm |ham,o|r−α/2am,o ,
and C in (10) can be rewritten as
C = 1− P {So < βIo} = 1− P
{
M∑
m=1
Xm <
√
βIo
}
. (42)
As Xm obeys the Rayleigh distribution with the PDF
fXm(xm) =
2rαam,oxm
PDm
e−r
α
am,o
x2m/PDm , due to the mutual
independence among {Xm}Mm=1, the joint PDF is given by
fX1,··· ,XM (x1, · · · , xM ) =
M∏
m=1
2rαam,oxm
PDm
e
− r
α
am,o
xm
PDm . (43)
Substituting (43) into (42) yields
C = 1− EIo
[∫
X
M∏
m=1
(
2rαam,oxm
PDm
e
− r
α
am,o
xm
PDm
)
dx1, · · · , dxM
]
(e)
= 1−
∫
V
EIo
[
IMo e
−ψ1βIo] βMψ2dv1, · · · , dvM , (44)
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with the integration domain {X : x1 ≥ 0, · · · , xM ≥
0,
∑M
m=1 xm <
√
βIo}; (e) follows from the replace-
ment xm → vm
√
βIo. Substituting EIo
[
Imo e
−sIo] =
(−1)m dmLIo (s)dsm in Theorem 4 with s = ψ1β into (44)
completes the proof.
F. Proof of Theorem 7
From (35), β < W−1/δ should be ensured to achieve a
positive To(β). It is easily proved that dTo(β)dβ in (36) is positive
at β = 0 and becomes negative as β → W−1/δ. Hence, at
least one zero-crossing of
dTo(β)
dβ exists. Denote an arbitrary
one as βo such that
dTo(β)
dβ |β=βo = 0. This yields
1−Wβδo
1+βo
=
Wδβδ−1o ln(1 + βo), and then
d2To(β)
dβ2 at β = βo is given by
d2To(β)
dβ2
|β=βo =
−δ
βo(1 + βo)
[
1 +W
(
βo − ln(1 + βo)
β1−δo
)]
.
(45)
βo ≥ ln(1 + βo) yields d
2To(β)
dβ2 |β=βo < −δβo(1+βo) < 0, i.e., To
is quasi-concave on β. In other words, To(β) initially increases
and then decreases with β and is maximized at β = βo.
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